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**TITLE:**

OPERATIONAL CULTURE: IS THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY DRIVING THE TRAIN OR LEFT  
AT THE STATION?

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*The outcome of future conflict will increasingly be decided in the minds of...populations rather than on the battlefield. Therefore, combat operations can no longer be seen as the decisive phase of conflict.*

Australian Army, *Adaptive Campaigning*, Nov 2006

## **INTRODUCTION**

Operational culture is a new wave of study enjoying much enthusiasm and popularity within most Western contemporary armies. Governed by the mission at hand, “operational culture” encompasses those aspects that can influence the outcome of a military operation, or conversely, those military actions that influence the cultural balance within an area of operations.<sup>1</sup> As such, the correct application of operational culture is critical for any military force to favorably shape its own operating environment. In the Australian Army today, no cultural training is currently formalized. Individuals or units notified for deployment have to invent their own training objectives and this lack of institutional training necessitates adaptation while on operations. The decision on training objectives, how much training to conduct and how to adapt while on operations is largely left to the commander’s discretion. To improve organizational paradigms resulting in enhanced shaping capabilities, the Australian Army needs to define cultural capabilities that will function in future warfare and train individuals and units to be able to fulfill that capability.

### **Overview**

Twenty-first century military experience has been characterized by many factors: maintenance of combat tempo, adaptation in a complex operating system and large scale coalition operations. With warfare currently consisting of a mixture of conventional and unconventional conflict it is safe to assume that future conflict will also comprise to some degree the same mix. One certain factor is that all armies of the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia (ABCA)<sup>2</sup> consider culture to be vital across the spectrum of operations. The Australian Army’s current approach to

operational culture has worked for many years, enduring numerous conflicts, but if the Army wants to improve the way it operates and ensure it is effectively prepared for future warfare the Australian Army must change its methods.

## **Background**

The Australian soldier has long relied on the “good bloke” factor when dealing with foreign cultures. It has got Australians so far for so long. Unfortunately, as the world changes, the good bloke factor is no longer enough. The Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy (Service Chief equivalent in the US), publishes his “Intent” each year. The 2007 version included some new direction on Cultural Awareness. The three key Strategic Drivers he is concerned with presently are: 1) Societal / Human issues; 2) Ongoing globalization issues; and 3) Environmental issues. The main issues as they relate to this paper are the Societal / Human issues. One subset is the cultural and linguistic elements required to be developed by the Australian Army to be able to fight in combat more effectively. The Chief of the Australian Army states that there is an enduring aspect to cultural perspectives of warfare and this should be weighed against the transient nature of technology. This highlights the importance the Australian Army is placing on Operational Culture.

## **CULTURE**

### **Definition.**

Sociologically, culture is the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings which is transmitted from one generation to another. Militarily, this definition is insufficient and does not really assist the Australian Warfighter. It does not describe reality as it will exist on an operational deployment, encompassing the dynamics of circumstance. For the Warfighter, culture can be defined as a shared world view and social structures of a group of people that influence a person's and a group's actions and choices.<sup>3</sup> These actions give a Warfighter something observable


on the ground that can be analyzed and incorporated into operational planning. The Warfighter is not going to be concerned with all aspects of culture but only those aspects that influence the area he is operating in. Therefore, operational culture as a term is of greater use to the Warfighter than simply culture; that is, those aspects which can influence the outcome of a military operation or, conversely, those military actions that influence the cultural balance within an area of operations.<sup>4</sup>

Other key definitions that need to be addressed for this paper are human terrain, social environment and cultural factors. “Human terrain” encapsulates those cultural aspects of the military environment, which, due to their static nature, can be visually represented on a geographic map. Human terrain is static with respect to change over time and rigid with respect to fluid human relationships.<sup>5</sup> It is the “social environment,” the features of which, processes and interactions within the military area of operations, are dynamic. Once the human terrain has been mapped, the social environment can be manipulated (or in military terminology: shaped), including the human relationships and interactions among the people.<sup>6</sup> “Cultural factors” are aspects of society that have the capacity to affect military operations. They include: religion, ethnicity, language, customs, values, practices, perceptions and assumptions, power and influence sources, and driving causes like government, political and social grouping structures, economy and security. All these factors affect the thinking and motivation of the individual or group and make up the cultural terrain of the battlespace. Not all factors are applicable to all operations, and additional factors may need to be considered as necessary.<sup>7</sup>

### **Levels of Expertise.**

The study of operational culture is popular and gaining momentum in most Western militaries at the moment. Unfortunately, much of the terminology across service or coalition boundaries is being used in a contradictory manner. This paper will lay out what these terms are

defined as, but also show that a hierarchy exists in the application of these terms within the operational culture construct. As depicted in Figure 1, these terms are cultural acknowledgement, cultural awareness, cultural understanding, and cultural empathy.



**Figure 1. This figure depicts the hierarchical relationship within operational culture. It also shows the size of the Australian Army expected to employ that level (in relative terms).**

**Cultural Acknowledgment** exists at the bottom of the pyramid depicted in figure 1. It is the basic acceptance of the direct importance of cultural operations. This is to admit that cultural factors will influence the future battlefield and by working to improve and then exploit those skills in the soldier the Australian Army will have a better chance of operational success. This acknowledgement illustrates various cultures are different and we should strive to learn more about them. This level is the minimum the Australian Army should expect from junior ranks during peacetime training. This prepares soldiers for higher level learning and lays the foundation for developing professional and personal interest in cultural education.

**Cultural Awareness** is the knowledge of cultural factors and a comprehension of their impact on the planning and conduct of military operations. Cultural Awareness results from both


standardized and specific training.<sup>8</sup> The 2006 ABCA Standardization publication on *Cultural Awareness* claims that cultural awareness can reduce battlefield friction and the fog of war, thus improving a unit's mission accomplishment. Awareness gives insight into the intent of various actors within our battlespace and the way these actors interact within groups. We can use this information in our attempt to shape the battlefield towards more favorable conditions or build rapport to prevent misunderstandings that might prevent us from accomplishing our mission.<sup>9</sup> It will also support planners in developing centers of gravity to ascertain critical vulnerabilities. This will assist in campaign planning and the proper allocation of resources. Cultural Awareness is the minimal level of cultural knowledge we should expect from soldiers on an operational deployment (see figure 4).

The Deputy Chief of the Army, Major General John Cantwell, in his "Planning Guidance for Development of Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army," dated November 2007, has defined **Cultural Understanding** as the capacity for active study of human and cultural influences affecting all decision-making and actions in the operating environment, in order to optimize one's own decision superiority through empathy.<sup>10</sup> This definition refers to a deeper awareness of the specific culture that allows general insight into the thought processes, motivating factors and other issues that may be scrutinized for planning purposes.<sup>11</sup>

Dr Patrick Guinness, Head of the School of Archaeology and Anthropology at the Australian National University, stated on 16 August 2007, during a trip to Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia, that it is crucial to understand the cultural environment in which our Army must operate. We must go beyond the understanding of the societal and cultural environment and indeed "empathize," that is, identify mentally with and so completely comprehend a culture.<sup>12</sup> The Chief of the Australian Army has put emphasis on empathy in his "Commander's Intent" to the Army. In

direction that is similar to Dr Guinness' premise, he urges Commanders to strive for cultural empathy in training and on operations.

**“Cultural Cunning”** is the real crux of the war-fighters capability. The application of cultural cunning can occur when key personnel are able to integrate information gained and the understanding of the cultural factors. This fusion of information and military requirements will support mission success with the application of cultural cunning. It is well and good to have operational situational awareness and to culturally understand the factors in your operating environment but to have the astuteness to be able to use your knowledge correctly and ascertain outcomes that are advantageous to the war fighter is what key personnel (commanders and planners) should be striving for in the hierarchy of operational culture. In figure 1, cultural cunning would sit on top of the pyramid, needing all those that precede it to be able to be employed.



**Figure 2: The cultural knowledge hierarchy depicts what you can achieve the more time is allocated towards it.**



The Cultural Knowledge Hierarchy as depicted in Figure 2 portrays a curve that increases in knowledge as time moves forward. The more time one has to study a culture the greater he should be able to reach in the hierarchy. Starting with a basic acknowledgment, to awareness, understanding, and empathy then achieving cultural cunning.

## **FUTURE WARFARE**

### **Challenges.**

It is difficult to predict what future warfare will look like. It is a problem for the ages and why so many militaries in history have been branded as “prepared to fight the last war” when a new type of conflict emerges. The nature of war will remain enduring; however, the characteristics will change. Regardless of technical innovation and natural emergence recent trends suggest that conflict in the future will increasingly involve diverse actors, all competing for the allegiance of targeted populations. This is not drastically different from contemporary warfare. It does, however, suggest that this form of warfare is here to stay. Montgomery McFate describes the adversary of future conflict as “non-Western in orientation, transnational in scope, non-hierarchical in structure, and clandestine in approach; and it operates outside of the context of the nation-state.”<sup>13</sup> This description of future warfare is what many have come to define as “Irregular Warfare.”

A common argument being debated in professional military journals presently is the degree to which modern militaries should be preparing forces for irregular warfare as opposed to conventional high end operations. With the operational tempo so high at the moment and with no foreseeable end, preparing for one is usually at the expense of the other. There is a high probability that they will co-exist, but the degree to which one is more important than the other is unknown. The author agrees with the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare (2007), which claims it will be a supported/supporting relationship.<sup>14</sup> In short, both aspects of

conflict will be present, either conventional conflict will support the irregular warfare piece or the irregular operations will support a conventional fight. As such, fighting on the future battlefield will depend not just on traditional military process but also understanding social dynamics like tribal politics, social networks, religion, and cultural norms. The key to favorably shaping the battlefield and striving for victory will be in the minds of the populations rather than pure kinetics. As the Australian Future Land Operational Concept, *Adaptive Campaigning*, states: “combat operations can no longer be seen as the decisive phase of the conflict and as a result, a comprehensive approach to future land force operations is required.”<sup>15</sup> The force of the future will require soldiers who are patient, persistent and culturally astute to be able to influence the operating environment in ways that enhance the Australian Army’s chances for battlefield success. This operating environment can be viewed as a Complex Adaptive System.

### **Complexity.**

A precise definition of Complex Adaptive Systems can be found in Professor Harold Morowitz and Jerome L. Singer’s publication, *The Mind, The Brain, and Complex Adaptive Systems*. Their explanation of Complex Adaptive Systems describes the system as involving numerous active actors, existing in many hierarchical layers, whose collective behaviors shape the whole.<sup>16</sup> Such aggregate behavior is non-linear, hence it cannot be simply examined from summation of the individual component parts. Each of these actors is individually diverse and when applied to the military context, it means each influence or flux introduced onto the system is uniquely different, each with its own unique impetus.<sup>17</sup> An important feature of Complex Adaptive Systems is the sensitivity to even small perturbations or events. One single impetus, either an input or extraction of an agent or energy, can produce a very broad range of reactions or responses. If the same impetus is

repeated in the exact same measure, one still cannot guarantee the same response. This makes it exceedingly difficult to predict a response of the system or even to establish likely scenarios.<sup>18</sup>

This has significance to military commanders or planners as they attempt to shape an outcome by military action. Each of the cultural factors listed earlier are related to the other factors in a complex way. Soldiers must understand the possible adaptation outcomes they are likely to encounter. Regrettably, understanding this entire system is impossible; the best military commanders can hope for is to understand where in this system they can input energy or influence to have an effect and analyze what is believed to be the likely result as the system adapts. An example of this in Iraq is understanding the Arab male requirement to save face and not be seen as abetting the coalition. As such, anonymous phone call centers have achieved a degree of success for the coalition. To be able to tell where a commander can have the most influence will require a certain degree of cultural empathy, then the commander can apply cultural cunning towards the actors and their cultural terrain.

## **THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY**

The first question that must be asked is: “Does the Australian Army’s conventional approach to training directly transfer across to fighting within the adaptive system of Irregular Warfare?” The direct and simplest answer is, yes. The Australian Army has the skills, knowledge and attitude to be able to operate successfully in this environment. The big BUT surfaces, however, with the follow-on question: “Can we do it better?” The Australian Army owes it to the people of Australia, the Army and the soldiers it commits to battle to try to operate more effectively, which would result in fewer casualties and achieve mission success in a more timely and efficient manner. The Australian Chief is also calling his target outcome “understanding cultural empathy.” With this he has decreed a three tiered approach: first, generic inculcation of cultural empathy to occur at individual and unit

collective training levels; second, focused Mission Rehearsal Exercises; and third, specific in-country cultural advisor assistance for the deployed units.

### **Education and Individual Training.**


Achieve this improved framework was the goal of the Chief of Army's "Intent" statement. There are two approaches the Australian Army can take to achieve these developments: Improve the cultural awareness of every single Australian Army soldier; and develop a pool of specialists. Generic inculcation should begin at the individual's military basic schools and enhanced through courses, either specialist courses or promotional courses, throughout a soldier's career. Until now this has been an ad hoc measure, implemented by astute staff recognizing a training requirement. To formalize this training the all-corps soldier training continuum and the all-corps officer training continuum needs to be amended and improved to account for this training. These continua begin at basic training and continue through a soldier or officer's professional military education (both mandatory career courses and mandatory promotional courses). Within the next year, it is recommended that a "training needs analysis" be conducted to determine the knowledge, skills and attitudes an Australian soldier needs to be able to execute operations in "complex human terrain."

To influence the future battlefield these skills should be defined, as they are not the traditional or core areas of expertise for most military forces. Once defined and ratified, specific skill sets will need to be implemented as training objectives into the soldier and officer all-corps training continuum to achieve the required results.

### **Peacetime Requirements.**

Figure 3 depicts, in a standard peacetime training continuum, that a soldier should be trained to achieve cultural acknowledgment. Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers should be trained to achieve cultural awareness. Key personnel in units and higher, such as commanding


generals, commanding officers, operations officers, future planners, and civil affairs teams to name a few, should be trained to achieve cultural understanding.



**Figure 3: A standard peacetime training objectives applied against the cultural hierarchy.**

To achieve the prescribed levels in figure 3, key personnel need to keep briefed by higher headquarters on likely location scenarios for possible deployment. Once deployment has been forecasted as likely or imminent it narrows and focuses the knowledge service personnel are required to have. Soldiers should be taken to the cultural awareness level to operate in this specific complex adaptive system that is the cultural operating environment of the country (or region) of the deployment. The officer and senior non-commissioned officer need to educate themselves to a cultural understanding level to be able to operate effectively within the cultural system. Key personnel mentioned above now need to move into the realms of cultural empathy to completely synchronize their attitudes with the culture in which they will find themselves and their units operating. Once this is achieved, cultural cunning can be employed to best shape the entire battlefield

to their advantage, albeit with kinetic or non-kinetic capabilities. These capabilities may or may not include language training.



**Figure 4: A standard operational deployment objectives applied against the cultural hierarchy.**

It is not easy to say the Australian Army should focus on any one country and develop a cultural awareness program or language improvement program for a specific set of cultures alone. To try and compensate, Australian Army units will run short courses to improve soldier's individual language skills. These could last anywhere from two days to two weeks. Soldiers that have an identified talent for a particular language may be sent to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) School of Languages (LANGS). At this school they participate in a three month language program aiming to develop their linguistic skills as well as cultural empathy. The course is instructed by people of an ethnic background relevant to the country they are studying. These soldiers will return to units to run

their own language training and cultural presentations. Individual soldiers identified to deploy on a detailed mission to a particular region will be subjected to a year long “cultural immersion” course at LANGS to prepare for a job in a particular country.

These language training opportunities are extremely scarce and may affect one or two soldiers per major unit in peace-time and a few more preparing for deployment. Unfortunately, a three month course does not train an individual adequately for a deployment as an interpreter, but frustrated commanders are employing these men in these positions.

There also exists a different kind of individual training regimen. An individual “augmentee” may be ordered into a specific theater to supplement a unit or indeed represent Australia in a coalition billet (as the author did as a Battle Major in the Multi-National Force Iraq Strategic Operations Center in 2005-2006). This individual will have to complete organized pre-deployment training with the 39<sup>th</sup> Personnel Support Battalion, Force Preparation Company. For the author this included area and situation briefs, Islamic cultural briefs, and operating forces briefs. This preparation is enhanced by in-country “Reception, Staging, On-forwarding and Integration” (RSO&I) training. Currently, this training lasts three days and includes one “double lesson” on regionally specific cultural information. To maintain a credible RSO&I training program, the Australian Army could use the assistance of cultural anthropologists. The lessons presented were given (in the author’s case) by an Australian Iraqi teaching language skills at LANGS. Although her language skills and cultural knowledge were genuine, her ability to be able to pass relevant information was marginal. However, a cultural anthropologist would be able to break down the physical and moral nodes that exist for the culture, place it in context of the region individuals are deploying to, and synthesize the information into something useful for soldiers of all ranks.

**Education and Unit Training.**

The second part of a soldier's cultural education will occur at the unit level. This will come in the form of selected countries or areas that a unit is likely to deploy to. For an Australian soldier this will often be the immediate "inner arc" for strategic National interests; it extends through the Indonesian Archipelago, East Timor, through Papua New Guinea to the islands of the South West Pacific. Any sustained conventional attack on Australia would need to come from or through these islands. Therefore, it is the region the Australian Army trains to operate in and must prepare for culturally during routine training cycles. These are the regions Australia has deployed troops to most frequently in the last ten years, not to conventional conflicts but in a security capacity, quelling coups, countering insurgency or combating militias. Such deployments have included Cambodia, Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), the Solomon Islands, and East Timor.

Individual training will differ from collective unit training. Within a unit, the commanding officer will give guidance on cultural training within his Commander's Directive issued at the start of each training year. If a particular unit has been designated to deploy then the training program will be tailored towards that country. Currently, units have posted a soldier with previous experience (more often than not with either military or civilian encounters) of any culture that a unit is likely to deploy to. Therefore, there are a number of soldiers within units and Brigades who have experiential knowledge to pass on regarding operational culture. This can be formalized in mounting directives or simply organized by the unit prior to deployment. This training is not mandated and purely at the commanding officer's discretion. The Army headquarters should direct the exact cultural training a unit needs to complete before deployment. Currently, the only direction is concerned with the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE).



The MRE is usually the last in several months worth of unit preparation. It should be occurring in the middle third of the allocated preparation training time for a unit to be able to fix the errors identified before the unit deploys. This change in organizational attitude needs to occur at the operational level for the natural flow on effect to the tactical level. To be suitably prepared for future warfare, units need to meet specific criteria in cultural education and training. One hundred percent of deploying soldiers need to be competent in cultural objectives specific to their position and rank in the soldier all-corps training continuum. This should be completed prior to being allowed to partake in the MRE. The Operations Branch of Army Headquarters could issue a directive stating the collective cultural training that must be complete prior to deployment. This would ensure an Army-wide standard to meet operational level intermediate goals. These goals can be re-examined periodically and modified to meet the adaptive cultural system units are deploying into. The case-in-point is Operation Catalyst (US Operation Iraqi Freedom). This would be the prerequisite for collective unit training to be tested at the MRE.

The most significant training a unit conducts in a formal setting facilitated by the Combat Training Centre (CTC) is the MRE. The CTC attempts to replicate the theater into which the exercising unit is about to deploy. It aims at exposing soldiers to the towns, the culture, and to the worst case threat that could present itself at any stage. The cultural aspects are highlighted by several methods. Firstly, role players replicate the major players a unit must deal with in theater. These include the national army, police, tribal and religious leaders, local and provincial government leaders, threat forces, as well as the general community. There is the drawback that the role players are not ethnic locals, such as Iraqis or Afghans, but soldiers being employed in that role. As such, only English is used throughout the MRE. This is recognized as a serious limitation in the MRE function but is one that is extremely difficult to overcome considering the small numbers of linguists

currently in the Australian Army and the high cost of employing civilians suitable for the role. The only time this varies is when the CTC is able to source a role player from LANGS and they can converse in the language applicable, otherwise it is limited.

With some direction of resources, the CTC could improve the soldiers' cultural awareness, an officer's understanding, and practice the unit's key personnel in application of cultural cunning. These resources need to improve posted numbers to be able to exercise a Brigade in a mixture of live and simulation. This would allow a larger number of troops to be exercised rather than the one Battalion rotated through currently. The use of linguists should be on a regular basis to add credibility, not only exercise role players, but as interpreters for the exercise NCOs/Officers as well. This would enable on the spot education and reinforcement. The CTC would need to be capable of this expansion by 2012 to prepare troops for the future of warfare in 2015.

### **Deployed Forces**

In theater, the unit will conduct ongoing training such as After Action Reviews (AARs) to determine the cause and effect of an action and what needs to be improved. This is as applicable to high-end combat as it is to engaging the civil community in a local market. Further training on languages and any specific cultural issue that has caused concern are presented throughout the unit. Continuation training in-theatre is also a key to maintaining current information across the unit. As formal cultural advisors are placed into unit headquarters in the future, this will greatly enhance ongoing theater training.


Australian units will use their various headquarters staff cells in a manner similar to other ABCA armies and produce various forms of stakeholder analysis for the commanding officer and his command team. This tries to depict local linkages between factions and interested parties. As knowledge grows from meetings, patrols or conversations it is amended and updated. In this way a

unit can leverage its knowledge of the local community and local nuances to the unit's advantage. Often units will not see positive results for long periods of time. This can be extremely frustrating, especially as there are no metrics to assess the productivity of the unit's actions.

### **Structural Change**

Organizational change is recommended in the form of establishing the Human Systems Company (HSC). This company should be raised as another company of the 1<sup>st</sup> Intelligence Battalion, a unit working directly for the 1<sup>st</sup> AUS Division. In a perfect world, these organizational positions would all be Intelligence Corps personnel, but this capability would be too hard to achieve in both force development and career management, even given a five year lead time. Therefore, as a compromise, the HSC would consist of all corps officers and NCOs. Force structure permitting, the HSC would be commanded by at Lieutenant Colonel post-command. The cell commander would be a Major and the detachment commander a Captain (with his second-in-command a senior Warrant Officer to facilitate half-team deployments).

The aim of the unit is to have five "cells" focusing on a region of the world (See figure 5 – cells are depicted in purple). Each region is broken down further into "detachments" that focus on a particular culture or country (detachment in figure 5 is depicted in green). The detachments would consist of six-man teams that can deploy on an operation with the Task Force or Battle Group headquarters to be able to provide advice to Headquarters planners (especially the Commanding Officer).<sup>19</sup> There are two deployable teams within the six man detachment to be able to provide some immediate redundancy. The fifth cell is not tasked with any region but would pick up unexpected tasks or assist in drawn out deployments, such as Iraq or East Timor has been. Once ongoing commitment has been identified, the conflict redundancy detachments should have twelve months minimum to focus their training and education on a region.



**Figure 5: The Human Systems Company**

It is envisioned that the HSC would maintain close analytical links with civilian academics such as PhD level anthropologists, social scientists, political analysts and country specialists. The role of the detachments deployed would be to immerse themselves in the local culture and try to gain cultural empathy so as to assist the unit in using cultural cunning to win the war. This is a crucial reason why military members, not civilians, must work and deploy in the HSC. They understand the military environment, and planning requirements but do not feel internal conflict when information they have provided may or may not be used toward a violent outcome.

## CONCLUSION

Culturally, the success that Australian soldiers have experienced is only due in part to limited cultural training. The natural curiosity of the soldier means that he has a strong desire to engage with “locals” at every opportunity. He sees locals as a source of fascination rather than anger, repulsion or disdain. Curiosity may be a national trait but the friendly nature of the soldier is not. This nature is derived partly from the way in which Australians exercise and train. Nevertheless, the Australian Army must accept greater responsibility for individual soldier and officer training and

education. Deciding what level in the cultural knowledge hierarchy the Army requires particular ranks or particular positions is the crucial first step. Carrying this into unit collective training is the second. An organizational adjustment of adding a Human Systems Company into the Intelligence Battalion with the specific role of becoming military experts in particular cultures to deploy with tactical level headquarters will allow Commanders and planners to employ cultural cunning to suit the complex cultural terrain the Australian Army will find itself operation amongst in the future.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Barak A Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, “Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications” (Quantico, Virginia: Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, 2007), 46.

<sup>2</sup> ABCA: With the ratification of the Basic Standardization Agreement 1964 (BSA 64) on 10 October 1964 by the Armies of the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Canada (CA) and Australia (AS), the current ABCA Armies’ Program was formally established as the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardization Program. In 2004, the US Army signed an MOU with the US Marine Corps that formalized their increasing participation in the Program. As a result, the US is currently represented by a single national position, typically through the senior US Army representative. New Zealand was officially accepted as a full member in March 2006 but the title remained unchanged as the ABCA Armies’ Program. The ABCA Program is a vibrant, proactive and evolving organization that reflects and pursues the shared national values and defense goals of its member countries. Today, the focus of the Program is on **interoperability**, defined as: *the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.* See <http://www.abca-armies.org/History>, accessed 28 August 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 29.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 46, 47.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>7</sup> ABCA Standard 2066, “Cultural Awareness Tactics, Techniques and Procedures”, authorized by COL D.A. MacLean, COS ABCA, 27 March 2007, 2.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>10</sup> Major General J.P. Cantwell, AO, “Planning Guidance for Development of Cultural Understanding Capability in the Australian Army,” dated 19 November 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Air, Land, Sea Application Center, “Cultural Impact on Tactical Operations,” November 2006, (Final Coordination Draft), 3.

<sup>12</sup> Dr Patrick Guinness, Head of the School of Archaeology & Anthropology, Australian National University, Canberra at a meeting with LTCOL Daryl Campbell, Australian Liaison Officer to the USMC, Quantico, on Thu 16 August 2007.

<sup>13</sup> Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 38, 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, 2005, 43.

<sup>14</sup> Joint Operating Concept (DoD), “Irregular Warfare,” Version 1.0, 11 September 2007, 2

<sup>15</sup> Australian Army, “Adaptive Campaigning: The Land Force Integrated Response to Complex Warfighting,” Version 4.15 (Canberra: Directorate Combat Development Future Land Warfare, 3 November 2006), 2.

<sup>16</sup> “Actors” are defined by Smith as all players in the system and involve friendly allied forces, foes, neutrals, civilians, NGOs, OGOs. Anybody capable of having an influence (either directly or indirectly) onto the system.

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<sup>17</sup> “Fluxes” encompass all influences onto the discussed system; from National interests such as diplomatic, informational, military and economic through to the influence of a private soldier could have with a single shot. This influence should be viewed in a complex non-linear state and the reader should avoid traditional military ‘cause and effect’ linear thought processes. Defined in James Moffat, Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare, CCRP Publication Series, 2003, 8-9.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., xi.

<sup>19</sup> The author has recommended Task Force and Battle Group level advisors as this has been the preponderance of force deployments in recent years. Only once has the Division sized Headquarters with units deployed since Vietnam and that was East Timor in 1999. All other deployments have been Battalion or Brigade. Higher Headquarters have been a National Command Element or Individual Officers fulfilling positions on coalition deployments. If a situation arose such as a World War, or even another Vietnam commitment where the Federal Government deemed it necessary to conscript, then the HSC would surge in numbers to complement.

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